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ABSTRACT  
Against the background of claims made about the emergence of a new 
Knowledge-based Economy,  I explore the role of knowledge, learning and 
innovation in the economy and in relation to regional economic development and 
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to successive conceptions of regional development policies  through the lens of the 
successive transformations of a particular regional economy – that of north east 
England. Rather than seeing knowledge as something that has only recently 
become relevant to economic performance and to understanding of the economy 
and economic development, I argue that knowledge is central to all economic 
activity, and that different types of such activity draw upon and require different 
types of knowledge. 
 
Introduction 
 
There is widespread agreement that all economic activity – as purposeful human 
behaviour – necessarily depends upon knowledgeable behaviour and intentional 
human action; without a knowledge base, such activity would clearly be 
impossible. Thus an economy that is not based upon knowledge is, literally, 
inconceivable. The creation of knowledge has been integral to the development of 
capitalist economies since they were first constituted as capitalist, as Marx and 
Schumpeter (among other political economists) emphasised. Much of the 
revolutionary potential of capitalism has always rested in its capacity to create new 
commodities and new ways of commodity production via successive radical 
transformations of the forces of production and the labour process. Marxian 
political economy, conjoined with more recent approaches such as those of the 
French regulationists (for example, see Jessop and Sum, 2007), continues to 
provide a powerful perspective thought which to understand the contemporary 
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economy, especially in those versions of cultural political economy (for example, 
Sum and Jessop, 2008) that seek more explicitly to incorporate consideration of 
issues of meaning and semiosis with more traditional concerns of commodity 
production and value. Such perspectives of Marxian political economy inform the 
interpretative approach adopted in this paper approach  
 
Much has also been written in recent years about knowledge creation and transfer 
and related issues from more recent and different theoretical perspectives, such as 
those of knowledge creation, learning and national and regional innovation 
systems that place considerable weight upon knowledge and learning per se as 
sources of competitive advantage and economic success (LUNDVALL, 1992; 
NONAKA and TAKEUCHI, 1995). There are three main ways in which knowledge 
is now seen as more important in the economy. Firstly, there is greater emphasis 
on knowledge per se as a commodified output, in part linked to the greater 
significance of symbolic products. Secondly, there is greater emphasis on 
increasing the knowledge intensity of existing commodities, both material and 
immaterial, shifting up the value chain towards more knowledge intensive 
activities. And, thirdly, partly linked to this, are the increasingly blurred boundaries 
between material commodities and services produced via the interaction of people 
and things. 
 
Initially, influenced heavily by the experiences of parts of the USA, such as 
California and New England, and the advocates of the „triple helix‟ approach 
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(ETZKOWITZ and LEYDESDORFF, 2000) these placed most emphasis on flows 
of codified knowledge within formal organisational and institutional structures and 
upon links between „high-tech‟ industries and entrepreneurial Universities in the 
translation of scientific knowledge into innovative products and processes 
(LUNDVALL and MASKELL, 2000). However, later and more nuanced approaches 
placed more emphasis upon tacit knowledge and the interactions and relationships 
between codified and tacit knowledges (for example, see AMIN and COHENDET, 
2003; ASHEIM and COENEN, 2005; JENSEN et al, 2007).  
 
This growing emphasis upon knowledge has been influential in shaping new 
conceptions of urban and regional development policy and strong claims have 
been made as to the potential of such developments for urban and regional 
regeneration, linking the knowledge-based competitive advantage of firms with that 
of territories defined at various spatial scales (BRACZYK et al, 1998; SIMMIE, 
1997). This draws attention to the significance of the place-specificity of processes 
of knowledge production and translation and the importance of tacit knowledge in 
enabling codified knowledge to be effectively deployed in the economy in place. 
The successful economies of fin-de–siécle capitalism are seen to be those of 
territories (cities, regions, national states) that, by good luck or judgment, have 
become constructed around activities grounded in valuable knowledges that can 
be literally capitalised and become a source of profit. The future success of these 
territories is seen to depend on the continuing production of new knowledge, 
translating this into innovative products and processes and maintaining first-mover 
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advantages. This emphasis within policy discourse reflects perceived changes in 
the ways that knowledge is now seen as important in the economy. The task of 
public policy is then to try to ensure that the knowledge-based process of moving 
forward, ever onward and upward, is facilitated in successful places and that the 
lessons of their success are translated to unsuccessful places, in so far as this is 
possible within the parameters of capitalist social relations.  
 
Claims about the emergence of new KBEs can therefore also be seen as 
recognition that the knowledge bases of formerly successful economic activities 
(as registered in mainstream indicators of capitalist development) and the regional 
economies that these helped constitute have been rendered redundant by 
sectoral, technological and spatial shifts in the capitalist economy. Consequently, 
commodities that could once be profitably produced in a given place can no longer 
be so. This recognises that the economy is knowledge-based but that capital 
valorises some knowledges while devalorising others. Therefore, so the policy 
story goes, it follows that reconstruction of the economies of places that have 
become unsuccessful requires shifting to new activities with different knowledge 
bases that can be successfully capitalised and valorised and learning from the 
experiences of economic „hot spots‟. It is this that is signalled by normative claims 
about the perceived need to move trajectories and encourage and facilitate the 
emergence of a new KBE via specific forms of public policy that privilege particular 
sorts of knowledge and institutions in the creation and dissemination of that 
knowledge. In this, of course, there are two major assumptions. First, that the 
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bases of success of the „successful places‟ have been correctly analysed and 
diagnosed in terms of the primacy of such knowledge as the main source of 
competitive advantage. Secondly, that the direction of the causal links between 
theory and practice has been correctly specified. However, this is a matter of 
debate – some see theory as shaping practice, others see theory as reflecting 
practice while others see links between the two as reciprocal and complex, not 
easily amenable to sweeping generalization, leaving  the issue of the effects of 
policy unresolved (HUDSON, 1999; MORGAN, 1995; LOVERING, 1999). 
 
Seen in this context, the issues to be addressed in this paper can be re-stated in 
terms of a number of questions. First, and centrally, how have changing 
conceptions of the role of knowledge been reflected in successive strategies for 
regional development in north east England, and in particular in the recent turn to 
an explicitly knowledge-based economy? In turn, this requires some consideration 
of broader questions. What is the role of knowledge relative to other factors and 
processes as a source of competitive advantage? What is new and specific about 
the role of knowledge at the leading edges of contemporary capitalist 
development? What sort of knowledge, development strategy and policies are 
required for what sort of economy? Indeed what may well be at issue is what we 
mean by the economy, what counts as „the economy‟, and how we conceptualise 
it. This may involve consideration not simply of the differing knowledge bases of 
varied types of economic activity but more fundamental questions relating to 
different concepts of value and processes of valuation within a more 
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heterogeneous and plural conception of what is to be counted as „the economy‟. 
But this is to anticipate … 
 
In this paper, therefore, and against the background of more general claims made 
about the emergence of a new KBE (ALLEN, 2002; HUDSON, 2001; 2005; 
JESSOP, 2000; LEINBACH and BRAUN 2001),  I want to explore the changing 
role of knowledge in the economy through the lens of the successive 
transformations of a particular regional economy – that of north east England – 
and the successive conceptions of development policy that have been pursued 
there and, if only implicitly for much of the time, shifting conceptions within policy of 
the required knowledge base for that economy to prosper. The remainder of this 
paper falls into five sections. First, I consider in more detail some of the claims as 
to what is seen to be new in terms of knowledge and the new ways in which 
knowledge is now seen as economically significant. The next section considers the 
emergence and development of the north east region‟s economy from the 
nineteenth century, as a centre of radical innovation and knowledge creation that 
underpinned its economic success. Thirdly, in response to the secular decline of 
that economy from the late 1950s, I examine the emergence of an alternative 
branch plant economy, with its very different requirements in terms of knowledge, 
and various alternatives that were explored to that largely unsuccessful 
development policy, such as the pursuit of endogenous growth through small 
firms. Then, in recognition of the limitations of all these various policy options, a 
new suite of policies that self-consciously sought to promote the emergence of a 
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new and more managed KBE in the region began to appear from the 1990s. 
These are considered in the penultimate part of the paper. Finally I reflect upon 
this developmental and policy history and seek to draw some lessons from it.  
 
So what‟s new about knowledge in the „new‟ economy and the way we think about 
it now?  
 
Given that there is a general acknowledgment as to the importance of knowledge 
in the economy, why then the recent widespread fascination, even obsession, with 
knowledge-based economies (KBEs), both in academic discourse and 
development policies? What is seen now as novel about the role of knowledge in 
the “new” economy)?  What‟s all the fuss about? 
 
In recent years the social science and business literatures have become replete 
with claims as to the growing importance of knowledge and information flows in an 
(allegedly) weightless, de-materialised “new” economy of informational capitalism 
(CASTELLS, 1996),  in particular in terms of the extent to which knowledge can be 
digitised, commodified, and capitalised to underpin a new knowledge-based 
economy.  There are strong claims to the effect that this new economy operates in 
a complex, non-propinquitous, multidimensional cyberspace, with novel spatial 
dynamics grounded in the possibilities that cyberspace offers for simultaneous co-
location of myriad entities and relationships (JESSOP, 2000, 4; see also 
LEINBACH and BRUNN, 2001).  Moreover, there is no doubt that there has also 
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been some growth in the importance of some sorts of knowledge and information 
in the economy in relation to material commodity production, to the production of 
high ‟level services, and to the production of a range of „symbolic‟ commodities.  
 
The selectively increased importance of flows of knowledge and information in 
some sectors of capitalist economies has highlighted the importance of processes 
of knowledge creation and flows of information within firms via a range of types of 
learning  (such as single and double loop) and ways of learning (by doing, by 
imitating, by watching, in working and so on). These become linked in inter-related 
and recursive ways so that learning and innovation involve complex circuits of 
knowledge and information rather than the linear flows of the hierarchical R&D 
model. The growing distanciation of many economic relations within an 
increasingly spaced-out economy as the locations of activities both within and 
between firms become further separated by physical distance is made possible by 
increasing digitalisation and other improvements in ICT and transport technologies. 
Flows of information both increase in volume and in distance travelled, as do flows 
of people as sites of embedded and tacit knowledges, in the process re-working 
the meaning of work in the globalising economy (JONES, 2008). More generally, 
there is evidence of the creation of new global circuits of intellectual capital 
(THRIFT, 2005).  
 
Recognising these recent changes, it is nonetheless equally important to 
acknowledge that the economy has always depended on knowledgeable workers, 
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flows of knowledge and information and mixes of codified and tacit knowledge so 
that claims as to the increased importance of flows of knowledge and information 
for economic performance must be carefully qualified. What is at issue is the 
changing significance of knowledge, the varying „mixes‟ and types of knowledge, 
and the routes through which they flow into the production of any commodity. For 
example, ALLEN (2002, 39-40, emphasis in original) emphasises “the symbolic 
basis of all forms of economic knowledge”. Furthermore, “different economic 
activities play across a variety of symbolic registers – abstract, expressive, 
affective and aesthetic – and combine them in ways that render sectors 
distinctive”. Symbolic knowledge is not, therefore, confined to the production of 
cultural commodities, and it may have become relatively more important across a 
range of other commodities. Conversely, producing symbolic outputs, as with 
services, typically requires substantial material underpinning and infrastructure, not 
least in creating specific settings to enable co-presence of producers and 
consumers. For example, IT services require particular sorts of buildings, 
computers, network connections, electricity – which requires power stations, which 
in turn require coal, oil, nuclear fuel, or some form of non-fossil fuel generating 
technology. The issue here is the complex connections between different bits of 
commodity production that allow the production of new “symbolic commodities” 
rather than the emergence of de-materialised commodities in a digititalised, 
weightless economy. The material basis and weight remain critical, albeit 
distanciated from the particular sites from which flows of information and 
knowledge emanate.  
 11 
 
JESSOP (2000, 2) suggests that “what is novel in the current period [of capitalist 
development] is the growing application of knowledge in developing the forces of 
production and the increased importance of knowledge as a fictitious commodity in 
shaping the social relations of production”. For example, one indication of this is 
the expanding volumes of patents awarded to companies involved in 
biotechnology and bio-engineering, which are positioned at the forefront of the new 
“knowledge economy” in which “information and ideas have become critically 
important economic assets” (BOWRING, 2003, 118), At least three processes are 
involved in transforming knowledge into a fictitious commodity, altho8gh it is 
important to acknowledge that these are not new to a capitalist economy but that 
they have increased in intensity and extent. These involve both qualitative 
transformations and flows of knowledge between people, companies and other 
organisations involved in the economy. First, the formal transformation of 
knowledge from a collective resource („intellectual commons‟) into intellectual 
property as a basis for revenue generation (for example, as a licence or patent). 
Secondly, the formal subsumption of knowledge production under exploitative 
class relations through the separation of intellectual and manual labour and the 
transformation of the former into alienated wage labour, producing knowledge as 
an exchange value rather than as a use value. Thirdly, the real subsumption of 
intellectual labour and its products under capitalist control through their 
commodification and integration into a networked, digitised production-
consumption process controlled by capital, of information produced by a firm not 
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for its own use (as a use value) but to sell to another to deploy in its production 
process (as an exchange value).  
 
Thus the distinctive features of recent developments in circuits of knowledge and 
intellectual capital are seen to relate to their global reach and speed of flow within 
them, changes enabled by technological innovations in ICT and the deployment of 
different combinations of knowledge in commodity production as the role of 
knowledge in the economy has changed qualitatively. Paradoxically, however, the 
greater fluidity in the movement of codified knowledge has enhanced the 
significance of tact knowledge and the key material sites in which it is produced 
and circulated. It is these changes in the movement of information rather than 
knowledge and learning per se becoming distinguishing features of the capitalist 
economy that are crucial. There are, however, limits to such processes.  
Cyberspace is not a “neutral third space” between capital and labour, market and 
state, public and private. Rather, it is a new terrain on which conflict between these 
forces institutions and domains can be fought out. Consequently, irrespective of 
the extent to which capital migrates into cyberspace, like all capital “it still depends 
on territorialisation” – that is, on materialisation in specific spaces, cities and 
regions. Indeed, “even e-commerce needs such an infrastructure, even if it 
involves a „celestial jukebox‟ sending digitised music on demand” (JESSOP, 2000, 
4). This in turn suggests that those cities and regions in which such activities have 
become materialised have become pivotal and will become of still greater 
significance in shaping the development trajectories of capitalist economies and in 
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reproducing the map of uneven development. This suggests that the extent to 
which peripheral places can gain as a result of the new developmental trends may 
be severely circumscribed, In turn, this calls into question claims that such polices 
constitute the panacea for the problems of such places.  
 
 
The Knowledge-based Economy, version I: the creation of a „workshop of the 
world‟ 
 
It is often remarked that north east   England was once one of the „workshops of 
the world‟, a region transformed in the nineteenth century into one of the 
birthplaces of industrial capitalism, a major site of production for key commodities 
and raw materials of the era of carboniferous capitalism. This remarkable 
transformation of  the region via the creation of a new form of economy was above 
all based upon invention, the creation of new knowledge, typically initially in the 
form of tacit knowledge as a result of the practical activities of engineers and 
working men, and its deployment in production via a range of radical product and 
process innovations in chemicals, coal mining, the production and use of metals in 
making ships, armaments, power stations and equipment and other complex 
commodities linked to the production of the means of production (MCCORD, 1979; 
NORTH, 1975).  
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Thus this emergence of new forms of economic activity based around radical 
product and/or process innovations and their deployment in commodity production 
was nothing less than the creation of a new KBE. Newly produced scientific 
knowledge was combined with existing knowledges, both codified and tacit, to 
form the epistemic basis of a new regional economy via translating new knowledge 
into radical innovations. The interplay of codified and tacit knowledges, of new and 
existing knowledges, and their resultant emergent effects, decisively shaped the 
competitive advantage of firms in the region. As such, the region became a pivotal 
location in the development of industrial capitalism, centred on major capitalist 
enterprises. These were typically linked into „coal combines‟ via a variety of 
economic and non-economic relations and ties and deployed strategies of strong 
Schumpeterian competition, based on first mover advantage and oligopolistic 
market domination, if not quite monopolistic control of markets (HUDSON, 1989). 
 
Moreover, this emergent KBE was based on a combination of endogenous capital 
and locally-produced knowledges with imports and inflows of both human labour 
(from Ireland and other regions of the UK), knowledge and raw materials (for 
example, by the 1870s, iron ores from Spain: BEYNON et al, 1994) and resulted in 
substantial outflows and exports of commodities and capital to the markets of both 
formal and informal Empires. For example, around the turn of the twentieth 
century, around 80% of all capitalist ship production emanated from the region. In 
these senses, it was from the outset a global region, deeply involved in the 
production of globalised relationships and global flows of capital. However – and 
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this is a key point - all stages of the production process in these varied industries, 
from R&D and the production of knowledge and its translation into new processes 
and products to material commodity production, were located in the region which 
became, for capital at least, the centre of a virtuous spiral of accumulation and 
growth1. Moreover, high level scientific and technical knowledges to support such 
R&D activities were underpinned by the development of Durham University‟s 
activities in Newcastle, as Armstrong College focussed on activities as 
engineering, with a direct feedback to the economy via the transfer of codified 
knowledge about production processes and products (pre-figuring proposals and 
developments around a century later: see below).  
 
The depression of the 1920s and 1930s had severe impacts upon this „old‟ 
industrial economy („old‟ in the sense that it no longer enjoyed its former first-
mover advantage as innovations had diffused internationally). Nonetheless, it 
managed to survive well into the 1960s, with a continuing although more selective 
and sporadic history of knowledge creation, R&D, and radical product and process 
innovation (much of it associated with the activities of ICI on Teesside). The inter-
war depression was characterised by severe job losses but, in general (there were 
exceptions: colliery closures in west Durham and the closure of Palmer‟s Jarrow 
                                                 
1
 Two qualifications are worth making regarding the growth process. First, there were often wild 
cyclical fluctuations around the upward trend. Secondly, the main beneficiaries of growth were 
local capitalists and their allies; working people and their families were commonly living in 
poverty, especially in cyclical downturns. 
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shipyard by National Shipbuilders Securities: see WILKENSON, 1939), it did not 
lead to large-scale capacity closure. While fixed capital was moth-balled and to a 
degree devalorised, in general it was not physically and materially destroyed. 
Consequently, when demand recovered the region‟s industrial economy could 
respond and revive in terms of output and employment, though less so in terms of 
fresh fixed capital investment In a way that typifies the contradictions of capitalist 
development, the regional economy was pulled from economic crisis by the 
combined effects of the war economy and post-war reconstruction. As a result, the 
sclerosis that had set into much of the economy did not become visible in terms of 
indicators such as output, employment and unemployment until the late 1950s, 
initially in coal mining and shipbuilding, but then in a progressively wider range of 
“traditional” industries. 
 
However, the design and R&D teams of the major shipbuilding and engineering 
companies (for example, Swan Hunter and Reyrolle Parsons) and especially 
chemicals (ICI at Wilton alone employed more than 200 PhD research chemists) in 
the region remained intact throughout this period; some even expanded. Indeed, 
the concentration of highly qualified research chemists at ICI can be seen as 
emblematic of the way in which knowledge creation had become intentionally 
designed to underpin commodity production and the process of capital 
accumulation. Moreover, to the extent that knowledge became patented and 
licensed to others, knowledge itself became capitalised, a commodity to be traded, 
bought and sold in markets. Nonetheless, in general this „old‟ industrial economy 
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had lost its radical innovative edge and the competitive advantages once conferred 
by its distinctive knowledge bases.  
 
There were a number of reasons for this, related to private- and public-sector 
decision-making processes. First, there were changes in corporate strategy: as 
commodities became mature, companies either went out of business due to 
intensified global competition or switched product and/or process and/or location 
and moved their R&D and related activities out of the north east (a process that 
was still continuing into the 1990s: PIKE, 2005). This locational switch was an 
integral part of changes in the international division of labour, and the rise of new 
production centres in other parts of the world. Secondly, nationalisation led to the 
centralisation of R&D in coal, energy and steel in locations outside the region. 
Privatisation of formerly nationalised industries had the same effect: the move by 
newly-privatised British Gas of its R&D activities from Killingworth to the south east 
in the 1990s was the last in a series of such relocations. One critical consequence 
of these moves was that the potential for translating high level knowledges and 
skills into new activities in the region and a resultant transformation of the regional 
economy onto a new knowledge base was lost. 
 
Interestingly, however, in one or two rare cases such a transformation of existing 
firms onto a new knowledge base did occur, registered in development discourse 
in the region (which is discussed more fully below) by recognition of the 
emergence of new clusters from the late 1990s. For example, on Tyneside this led 
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to the emergence of a sub-sea technology cluster, evolving from offshore activities 
that in turn had developed from previous shipbuilding activity. A second example 
emerged in the Tees Valley, with a cluster of high-level globally competitive 
engineering service firms evolving from firms that previously had been builders of 
bridges, railways and related products but that now sell their knowledge and 
expertise in design and project management in a global market. These 
transformations are a product of the link between two sets of processes. The first 
relates to the creation of “redundant” or “slack” resources (human, technical and 
infrastructural) left behind by the decline of traditional industries. The second 
focuses on the processes of corporate and sectoral re-organisation, the 
identification of new market opportunities, the selection of promising avenues of 
development, the organisation or creation of a new architecture of knowledge 
production and utilization and the discovery of new methods of production 
organisation to enable the emergence of a new technological and/or market 
trajectory to absorb this slack and put it to productive use.  
 
While recognising the potential significance of these examples of successful 
adaptation for development strategies in the region, the fundamental point is that 
these remain just that – rare examples of a counter-tendency2. The dominant 
effect of eroding the competitive edge provided by the knowledge bases that 
                                                 
2
 There was no inevitability about this, however. In other similar regions such transformations 
took place on a much larger scale. For example, in the Ruhr there a significant new cluster of 
environmental technology companies emerged from the declining coal and steel sectors. 
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underpinned the growth of the region‟s “traditional” industries is that of decline – in 
capacity, output and jobs. This was disclosed and registered as a profound 
regional deindustrialisation, with all the socio-economic and political difficulties that 
it brought, Recognition of this led to attempts to create a different sort of regional 
economy, with a different knowledge base. 
 
The Knowledge-based Economy, version II: the branch plant economy and beyond 
 
As the “old” knowledge-based economy began to exhibit signs of decline as early 
as the 1930s, , there were moves to develop new forms of state policy that would 
help construct an alternative form of economy based around inward investment in 
„new‟ – to the region - industries. This policy shift was initiated by established 
capitalist concerns which sought to construct a state regional industrial policy to 
protect their own interests and to counter the threat of social unrest as a result of 
rising unemployment and poverty. After a period of relative quiescence due to the 
effects of the war economy and post-war reconstruction in stimulating demand for 
products made in the north east, this policy of industrial diversification was 
prosecuted with renewed vigour from the late 1950s once it became clear that the 
decline of the region‟s old industrial economy was secular rather than cyclical.  
 
While a strengthened central government regional policy had been in place from 
the late 1940s, it had been implemented very selectively and with little enthusiasm 
or vigour in the north east. Specifically, only branch plants and back office activities 
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that would not compete on the labour market with established industries (coal 
mining, steel, shipbuilding and so on) were permitted to locate in the region 
because their outputs were seen as vital to post-war economic recovery and 
national economic performance in the 1950s (HUDSON, 1989).  Blocking the entry 
of potential competitors for male labour was crucial in ensuring that their labour 
forces remained intact and production endangered by labour shortages. As a 
result, such new branch plants as were permitted were concentrated in sectors 
such as clothing and consumer electronics, in which firms were primarily seeking 
to recruit female labour, while the expansion of public services such as education 
and health was also based upon enhanced female activity rates.  
 
However, once the “old” industrial economy was seen to be in secular decline, 
political-economic priorities changed. Not only was there a perceived need for 
alternative sources of male employment in the north east but unbalanced regional 
growth became recognised as a major impediment to achieving faster non-
inflationary national economic growth. The solution to these problems was seen to 
lie in a more vigorous implementation of a further strengthened central government 
regional policy, attracting new investment and jobs to the north east (and like 
regions), creating new sources of male employment there and reducing inter-
regional differences in economic performance and growth rates.  
                                                                                                                                            
The emphasis in building a new form of regional economy around branch plants to 
a degree also reflected the emerging academic literature on corporate 
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reorganisation and the new ways in which companies were using spatial difference 
as part of their competitive strategies as new geographies of production and 
spatial divisions of labour were emerging. Regional policy sought to use this and 
attract particular routine branch plant functions to the north east. This new branch 
plant economy required different sorts of knowledge and skills, with little or no 
demand for people with high level decision making, design and R&D skills. Instead 
it required people with more basic knowledge and limited qualifications but willing 
to accept the disciplines of Taylorised production in branch plants and back offices. 
This was still a KBE, but one based upon the import of codified knowledges as to 
how to organise routine production activities and requiring a limited range of skills 
and expertise within the region. Not only was there a much lower level of demand 
for people with mental and non-manual skills but such manual jobs as were 
provided were typically unskilled or semi-skilled and required different types of 
social and technical skills and competences to those of the „old‟ industrial 
economy. As a result, there were often problems in getting men who had worked 
in coal mines, steel works, shipyards and engineering works – above all those 
engaged in skilled work, with occupationally specific skills, often based upon tacit 
knowledge acquired „on the job‟ -  to work on factory assembly lines in the new (to 
the region) consumer goods component production and assembly plants, in the 
paper processing assembly lines of back offices, or in the new public service 
activities of education and health, with their emphasis upon caring and cleaning 
work. This was a key reason why this second version of a KBE in the region was 
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associated with increased female employment and with feminisation and a shift in 
the gender composition of the labour force.  
 
This shift in the industrial and occupational structure of the regional economy, and 
its enabling and requisite knowledge bases was also facilitated by a variety of 
state-sponsored and/or organised training schemes to ensure the availability of 
workers with appropriate knowledge and skills.  While the skill levels required of 
the „new‟ activities were generally modest, they were nonetheless skills (technical, 
personal, social and communication skills) that were not readily available in the 
region‟s labour market. Thus part of the offer to potential inward investors was that 
training would be provided to ensure that suitably qualified labour was available in 
sufficient quantity. This included specific training schemes for assembly line 
workers in the new automobile and electronics companies and later for the 
substantial numbers recruited by a variety of call centres. However, the rigorous 
recruitment criteria of the new companies, in a labour market in which supply far 
exceeded effective demand, meant that participation in these training schemes 
was no guarantee of employment – for example, at one point in the early 1990s 
Nissan had over 33,000 applications in response to advertising the availability of 
600 new jobs (HUDSON, 1995) 3. 
                                                 
3 State training schemes were by no means new. Local technical colleges (and later 
polytechnics) provided courses for engineers and skilled manual workers required by the 
„old‟ industries. Training courses were organised in response to the requirements of 
earlier rounds of branch plant investment - for instance in consumer electronics in the 
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The new manufacturing branch plants, increasingly a result of inward investment 
by multi-national corporations, were by-and-large demonstrably „global outposts‟, 
subject to capacity cutbacks or closure because of decisions taken in distant 
locations, with often devastating effects in terms of job loss in the north east 
(HUDSON, 1995). Some closed very quickly, others never even opened (such as 
the Siemens integrated circuit factory on north Tyneside), and on average the 
lifespan of branch plants shortened as more and more locations competed for 
them. Despite claims about changes in the character of inward investment and the 
emergence of embedded branch plants, with deeper commitments to the region 
and wider mandates (for example, to include limited incremental R&D activity), in 
practice such plants are rare and hard to find.  While Nissan has been located in 
the region for 20 years and elements of its supply chain have co-located in the 
north east, its factory at Washington New Town lost its mandates for R&D and 
some aspects of purchasing following merger with Renault. Nissan is therefore 
both a rare example of a plant that has remained for two decades, which sets the 
standard in terms of labour productivity and product quality for other plants in 
Europe and north America and by the standards of the north east provides well-
paid and stable manufacturing employment, but also one which has become less, 
rather than more, embedded with the passage of time. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1960s (HUDSON, 1980). However, then, the probabilities of acquiring employment 
requiring these newly-acquired skills were much higher.  
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While public sector back office activities of government departments have proved 
relatively stable, the later re-location of private sector back offices has exhibited 
greater volatility. Equally, while there has been an influx of call centres and 
particular types of business process activity across a wide range of sectors, these 
too are susceptible to closure and re-location in an intensely competitive global 
market as locations in Canada, China, the eastern länder of Germany, India and 
Russia seek to attract such labour-intensive (for now at least) activities. Although 
these are mostly “white collar” non-manual jobs, they too require only basic 
knowledge, skills and competencies, with often a greater premium on 
communication, personal and social rather than technical skills.  
 
By the late 1970s it was becoming clear that the dominant policy approach of 
attracting inward investment was failing to provide an adequate answer to 
problems of unemployment and lack of work in the region. The response to this 
was to shift the emphasis in policy to encouraging endogenous growth and the 
creation of self-employment in an emergent enterprise economy (HUDSON, 1998). 
This spanned a range of manufacturing and service activities, including tourism – 
the unifying factor seemed to be firm size rather than any more coherent shared 
characteristics. However, such a policy shift also valorised a new set of social and 
technical skills and competencies – summarised in terms of “entrepreneurship” 
and “enterprise” – but these proved to be in short supply in the region. Put another 
way, the policy switch to SMEs was predicated on untenable assumptions as to 
the availability of particular sorts of knowledges and skills in the region – and was 
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silent about the need to devise an appropriate demand–side policy response. 
When this conception of policy failed in practice to produce economic 
regeneration, the stage was set for a different policy-led version of the KBE to 
emerge, centred on new forms of knowledge and sites of knowledge production, 
diffusion and transmission. In this, the emergent regional policy was influenced by 
growing emphasis in parts of the social sciences on the (alleged) emergence of a 
„new‟ KBE and on the primacy of particular socio-spatial formations of this 
economy. It was also influenced, decisively, by the dominance of neo-liberal 
perspectives on the economy that transcended party political divides and 
emphasised the role of competition, markets and self-reliance in shaping the fate 
of people and places  
 
 
The Knowledge-based Economy, version III: New Labour, regional devolution and 
new science-based industries and knowledge transfer from the region‟s 
Universities 
 
While the election of the New Labour government in 1997 in many ways was 
marked by continuities with the neo-liberal policies of its Conservative 
predecessors, in other ways it registered important changes. In the context of 
policies for the regions in general, and the north east in particular, these changes 
reflected the convergence of three different sorts of pressures, two „economic‟ and 
the third „political‟. First, there was recognition of a persistent national productivity 
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„gap‟, especially between the UK and USA, reflecting lower levels of R&D and high 
level „knowledge-based‟ activities. This was linked to policy makers‟ changing 
understandings of the determinants of economic growth that placed greater 
emphasis on the quality of ideas, innovation and knowledge (for example, 
AGHION and HOWITT, 1998). This influenced national government policy and in 
turn filtered down to shape emerging conceptions of regional development policy 
(as is shown below). Secondly, there was recognition of continuing problems of 
regional uneven development as the north east persistently performed at the 
bottom of the regional economic performance league tables. This strongly 
suggested that previous economic development models (in all their varied forms) 
simply had not had, were not having and would not have their intended effects. 
Thirdly, there were increased pressures for growing regional devolution in parts of 
both central government and in some regions. These pressures were particularly 
prominent in the north east among certain business and political elites (and the 
reasons for this are discussed further below). The newly elected government saw 
the possibility of dealing with all three sets of issues simultaneously via new 
innovative devolved regional organisations in England, Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs: the Celtic fringes had had their own stronger versions of such 
institutions for many years).  
 
The RDAs (along with appointed Regional Assemblies) were launched in the 
context of various national initiatives intended to help resolve the national 
productivity problem via encouraging knowledge transfer from Universities to 
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regional economies and promoting an entrepreneurial culture in higher education 
(for example, establishing regional Science Enterprise Centres). This drew heavily 
on one particular conception of scientific knowledge and its translation into the 
economy (ETZKOWITZ and LEYDESDORFF, 2000; LUNDVALL and MASKELL, 
2000) and was a process that was to be heavily influenced in the north east by the 
subsequent involvement of international consultants ADL (see below). Problems of 
poor regional economic performance were to be solved by, literally, capitalising 
and capitalising on knowledge produced in the regions‟ Universities, facilitating the 
production of more knowledge intensive and higher value added commodities, 
principally in manufacturing but to a degree in services, reflecting the increasing 
de-differentiation of manufactures and services. Enhanced economic performance 
would result from both capitalising upon on-going scientific research in universities 
and via specifically seeking to shape their research activities and agendas, 
especially in science and engineering. This potentially raised difficult issues 
regarding the autonomy of universities and the determinants of research, the 
production of scientific knowledge and the ownership of IPR arising from that 
research. Implicit in this approach to economic development policy was a 
territorially-based model of knowledge production and dissemination, centred on a 
concept of regions as bounded and contiguous territories and regionally-defined 
organisational structures and intra-regional flows. Universities in the region 
responded to these schemes (DUKE et al, 2006). Individually and collectively, 
often in collaboration with other regional partners, they explored ways to 
encourage knowledge transfer to companies and public sector organizations (such 
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as the NHS) in the region and commercialise the results of their scientific research. 
At the risk of (over) simplification, these may be categorised as falling into one of 
four types: research centres, collaboration and consultancy; intellectual property 
(IP) transactions; promotion of spin-offs, incubators, science parks; training and 
labour mobility. 
 
While these national or UK–wide initiatives evoked specific responses within the 
north east, they also created tensions, both nationally and specifically within the 
region. The Treasury and Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) were primarily 
concerned with productivity and national economic performance, seeking to use 
these national initiatives to narrow the gap in productivity levels between the UK 
and its main international competitors and ease the transition to a high productivity, 
new KBE. They saw the prime role of RDAs as the elimination regional productivity 
differentials and the barrier that these posed to non-inflationary national economic 
growth4. Not all central Government Departments saw the role of RDAs in this 
way, however. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM,) had a much 
stronger commitment to regional devolution per se, a cause. Long championed by 
the „Old Labour‟ Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, whose 1983 alternative 
regional strategy was based upon greater regional devolution, regional 
                                                 
4
 Those with a sense of history – and irony – pointed out that this was precisely the argument 
used in the 1950s by Macmillan‟s Conservative government to justify introducing a revived and 
strengthened central government regional policy and soon afterwards specific initiatives for the 
north east of England: HUDSON, 1989.  
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development agencies and elected regional authorities. As a result, there were 
visible tensions within national government over the role of the new RDAs between 
the Treasury/DTI and the ODPM.  
 
Equally within the region there were divisions between those who wanted such 
devolved Agencies as part of a process of regional democratisation that would – 
inter alia – allow the formation and implementation of more effective regional 
development strategies and those who opposed them. These disputes reflected 
different conceptions of „the region‟ as a social actor, differences as to the 
appropriate site of policy formation, and divergent views as to which social 
interests should be prioritised in regional development policies. The opposition was 
something of an unholy alliance, bringing together three distinct factions. Firstly, 
those who opposed unelected RDAs because they were anti-democratic. 
Secondly, those who opposed the proposed form of elected RDA because it was 
simply too weak to be effective (an offer decisively rejected in a regional 
referendum in 2004). Thirdly, those who opposed an elected RDA because they 
saw it as disrupting existing and well-established organisational arrangements that 
originated in the 1930s and subsequently evolved into a succession of 
organisations „in and for‟ for the region These organisations were manned (the 
term is deliberate) by groups drawn from a small political and economic elite and 
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served their interests and those of their various constituencies (HUDSON, 1989; 
2006a; 2006b) 5 
 
However, the establishment of the Regional Development Agency, (ONE), in 1999, 
was a significant extension of past policies. Its main task was to forge a regional 
economic strategy but within strictly defined parameters as to what constituted the 
economy („the capitalist mainstream„), what constituted development (increases in 
productivity and GDP/caput) and as to the targets that had to be met and the tasks 
that needed to be achieved to ensure this. These constraints were not unique to 
ONE, applying to all the English RDAs. However, especially when combined with 
the influence of a small set of consultants who tended to be involved in the 
production of these strategies and who were selling essentially the same generic 
model of development to all regions6, they led to the counter-intuitive result that 
their various economic development strategies bore a close generic resemblance 
to one another, despite the very different regional contexts that they were 
supposedly addressing. As such, the creation of the RDAs and the ways in which 
they were steered and monitored by central government can be seen as one 
                                                 
5
 They included the Northern Economic Planning Council set up in 19966, the Government Office 
for the North East (GONE), established in 1993 to bring together central government activities 
and operations and the delivery of central government policies in the region within a more 
coherent framework and the appointed Regional Assembly created in 1999. 
6
 There are strong echoes here of THRIFT‟s (2005) emphasis on the significance of the global 
“circuit of cultural capital” and of the pervasive influence of a small set of consultants and their 
associates. 
 31 
expression of a new form of governmentality, of governing „at a distance‟, 
apparently devolving authority and power to regions but in practice tightening the 
grip of the centre over the regions (HUDSON, 2007). 
 
The emergent regional economic strategy in the north east had a clear and explicit 
focus on promoting a new sort of KBE - in part a product of a recognition of the 
inadequacies of previous forms of policy, in part of a growing international 
emphasis upon a certain sort of „knowledge-based economy as the route to future 
prosperity among international organisations such as the OECD and the EU with 
its Lisbon agenda. The region‟s universities were assigned – or, perhaps more 
precisely, sought for themselves - a key role in this as important regional actors, 
centres of research excellence and producers and disseminators of knowledge. 
University laboratories were to become key nodes of „high level‟ knowledge 
production, predominantly in the form of codified knowledge, and its transfer to 
private sector companies and public sector organisations in the region. While 
partly a response to pressures from the universities, this was also a realistic 
reflection of the absence of feasible alternatives to fill this role as key nodes of 
knowledge production and dissemination. By the late 1990s there was very little 
private sector R&D activity left in the region and there were no major government 
or public sector R&D facilities there. The north east regional economic strategy 
(ONE, 1999; see also 2003) specifically focused on universities as the prime 
mechanism for rebuilding the knowledge base, identifying „Placing universities and 
colleges at the heart of the Region‟s economy‟ as one of six main priorities.  
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However, there was no serious consideration of the knowledge transfer process, of 
the necessary relations between codified and tacit knowledges in this process, and 
of how new codified knowledge would be used in combination with existing tacit 
knowledge. Rather it was simply assumed that the production of such knowledge 
in universities and its (non-problematic) translation into the regional economy as a 
source of new products, processes and profits would act as a necessary - at times 
it even seemed sufficient – condition to set in motion a virtuous spiral of growth in 
the region. As a result, putting the region‟s universities at the heart of the regional 
economic strategy in this way was not without risks. From ONE‟s point of view it 
left its economic development strategy – with its strong claim that it would generate 
90,000 jobs in the new KBE (whatever that in practice would mean) in ten years – 
heavily dependent upon universities filling their assigned role in circumstances in 
which they had little experience of, or track record of success in, such translational 
activity. From the point of view of the universities, it created a weight of expectation 
as to their capabilities in knowledge transfer. Whether this was reasonable or 
realistic remained unclear, not least because successive UK national Innovation 
Surveys reveal that only 2% of companies regard universities as a highly important 
source of information (Miles and Daniels, 2007, 9).  Nonetheless, in the end, the 
KBE – or, more precisely, the specific form of its elaboration in ONE‟s strategy - 
came to be seen as a politically neutral leitmotif to which all those in the region 
who were „partners‟ in the strategy could sign up (after all, who could be against 
knowledge?). 
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This still left unresolved the question of how to translate research from the 
universities to produce the desired regional KBE. In seeking to answer this 
question, the production of the regional economic strategy became linked into the 
debate on „clusters‟ and the promotion of Porterian clusters as a key element in the 
process of knowledge transfer and successful regional economic development 
(although in fact ideas of cluster-based development were being floated in the 
north east in the 1960s: see HUDSON, 1989). Government White Papers in 2000 
and 2001 emphasised the role of RDAs and of Universities in underpinning 
economic vibrancy via support for clusters and innovation (DTI, 2000; DTI/DfEE, 
2001), uncritically accepting claims that territorial clusters were the best – indeed 
the only – feasible economic development model and failing to explore alternatives 
based around different spatialities and forms of inter-firm relationships.  
 
However, the question of which regional organisations could perform the role of 
broker and translator of knowledge from universities to economy still remained 
unanswered. The 2001 White Paper proposed establishing University Innovation 
Centres (UICs). However, in parallel to these and other national initiatives and 
schemes, ONE set out to create its own set of new regionally-specific intermediate 
organisations as an integral component in its emerging regional economic 
strategy.  Each English RDA was required to develop an innovation action plan as 
part of its initial guidance from government, building upon existing innovation 
strategies developed through the government regional offices, often assisted by 
funding from EU programmes. However, the resources available to support this 
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were very limited (between £250k and £440k per RDA per annum) while RDAs 
were highly constrained in their use of central government funds because funding 
streams were locked into central government programmes delivered in the 
regions. Furthermore the legacy of historically low levels of government R&D 
expenditure in the regions was seen as a key obstacle in moving towards a new 
KBE. As ONE (1999, 59) emphasized, „[t]here is a widespread belief throughout 
the Region that the Government must direct more Treasury funded research to 
Universities outside London, particularly to the North East.  This is essential to 
underpin the Region‟s approach to promoting knowledge transfer‟.   
 
One suggested approach to knowledge transfer was via Advanced Centres of 
Excellence (or Centres of Discovery), which like the, then new, International 
Centre for Life would combine research, exploitation, spin-offs, educational 
outreach, training and public understanding of science.  Four additional Centres 
were proposed, but without specifying technology areas or delivery mechanisms or 
locations. To help take forward the debate and clarify the potential role of such 
Centres, in early 2001 ADL was commissioned to review the research base in the 
North East in relation to current and future needs of key industry clusters. The ADL 
Report (August 2001) combined lessons learned from a parallel study in the North 
West with refinement of previous work in the North East and  provided a clear 
template for the region. The response to the report (ONE, 2001) was very rapid – 
indeed so rapid that it seems not unreasonable to assume that the response had 
already been decided ahead of the report. Submitted to the DTI in September 
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2001It it incorporated most of ADL‟s recommendations.  The core of the „Strategy 
for Success‟ was the formation of a Science and Industry Council (established in 
December), a regional exploitation agency NStar to provide access to finance, 
proof of concept investment and commercialisation advice and assistance and five 
„Centres of Excellence‟, each to be established as non-profit companies and 
located in different parts of the region.  The five Centres would focus on life 
sciences (Centre of Excellence for Life Sciences - CELS), new and renewable 
energy technologies (New and Renewable Energy Centre – NaREC), 
nanotechnology (Centre of Excellence for Nanotechnology, Photonics and 
Microsystems - CENAMPS), digital technologies (Codeworks) and process 
industries (Centre for Process Industries), this last based on the legacy of ICI‟s 
former R&D activities on Teesside (see CHAPMAN, 2005) – a mixture of 
technologies novel to the region and existing regional industrial and academic 
strengths.  .   
 
These five Centres of Excellence were intended to link the region‟s universities‟ 
research base – concentrated in Durham University and the University of 
Newcastle - to business, forming a bridge between their scientific research and 
industrial commercialization and the capitalisation of knowledge produced through 
research, while also recognising the need to forge extra-regional links.  ONE 
provided pump-priming resources but each Centre was required to plan for self 
sufficiency from commercial and investment income within five years. Whether 
prioritising short-term concerns with financial self-sufficiency over longer-term 
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concerns with qualitative regional economic transformation was realistic and 
sensible remains a moot point. Overall it was estimated that the RDA would invest 
£200 million over five years while aiming to leverage a similar level of investment 
from EU and other national programmes (ONE, 2003).  Each Centre evolved a 
distinct strategy, reflecting the characteristics of the technologies and sectors it 
supported and the legacies of existing Centres and activities. In addition Nstar 
sought to invest £33m in innovative technologies through proof of concept funding. 
However, in total and in relation to the task of shifting the regional economy onto a 
qualitatively different developmental trajectory, this was very modest funding.  
 
Following an appraisal of the Strategy for Success by the Regional Assembly in 
summer 2004 as part of its „scrutiny‟ role, ONE reviewed the programme, 
identifying three Centres as presenting the greatest potential for future economic 
growth. Accordingly, the programme was restructured around the three „pillars‟ of 
Healthcare, Process Industries and Energy and Environment, associated 
respectively with CELS, CPI and NaREC. Each pillar was to be directed by a 
Leadership Council, responsible for setting a strategic vision and overseeing 
delivery of the project, and incorporate industrial clusters and other „delivery 
partners‟ (including universities). ONE anticipated that each pillar could potentially 
contribute £2bn towards closing the North East‟s perceived £9bn productivity gap. 
The remaining two Centres (CENAMPS and Codeworks), along with NStar, the 
Northern Way Design Centre (see below) and a management skills programme 
provided via the Regional Skills Partnership, were to have more of a generic 
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underpinning and complementary role, supporting activity across the three sectoral 
pillars. Reflecting its aim that the Pillars should become self-financing, ONE 
proposed a two tier structure, with their public duty elements of activity financed by 
the Agency, and the remaining income generating elements run through a 
separate trading arm, responsible for commercialisation. 
 
The emergence in 2004 of the Northern Way growth strategy involved ONE in 
discussions with two other RDAs (the North West and Yorkshire and Humberside) 
around a wider pan-regional strategy for investment in science in collaboration with 
eight research-intensive universities in the North, known as the N8. However, the 
scale of additional funding was again modest – a “growth fund” of £100 million over 
the period 2005-2008 spread across the three RDAs, with only £10 million targeted 
at knowledge transfer and science and innovation priorities (NORTHERN WAY, 
2005). Clearly there is limited scope for new initiatives within these budgetary 
limits. In addition, Newcastle was one of three cities were designated as science 
cities. The RDA, Newcastle City Council and Newcastle University acquired a 
development site, „science central‟, near to the University and  intended to be a 
new translational research campus, grounded in a place-bound concept of 
„science city‟.  This, however, generated visible tensions between those who saw 
„science city‟ in this way, eliding it with „science central‟, and those who envisaged 
„science city‟ as a distributed regional network, encompassing other key nodes of 
scientific knowledge production and research, both new (such as NETPark in 
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County Durham) and more established (such as CPI on Teesside, which merged 
with CENAMPS in 2007),  
 
How successful these various initiatives will be in facilitating the emergence of a 
new KBE and closing the inter-regional output   remains to be seen. There is some 
initial evidence of the „pillars of excellence‟ developing as nodes in knowledge 
flows (TULLY et al, 2006) and innovative firms in the north east being more likely 
to exploit contacts with Universities as compared to other English regions 
(Johnson and Reed, 2008, 24-5) but this is some way from the effective translation 
of results from scientific research into the cognitive basis of a „new‟ regional KBE. 
However, there are continuing uncertainties as to the development of „science 
central‟ and the time frame in which this might happen and, more generally, it 
remains to be seen how effectively „science city‟ as well as the „pillars of 
excellence‟ will evolve as mechanisms for delivery of the transition to a new 
regional KBE. Moreover, influential analysts have cast doubt on the wisdom of 
relying on developing new industries on the basis of new knowledge and novel 
technologies, seeing it a high-risk and likely to fail and arguing for a different 
strategy that sought to build more upon the legacies of previous versions of the 
KBE (OECD, 2006).  
 
Conclusions and Some Questions 
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By the 1990s it was abundantly clear that the various policies pursued in the north 
east had failed to have their intended effects, of producing a stronger, more 
diversified and resilient regional economy. The region continued to bump along at 
the bottom of league tables of regional economic performance, with persistent high 
levels of multiple deprivation and sharp intra-regional socio–spatial disparities in 
well-being. This encouraged – some might say politically necessitated – an urgent 
search for fresh policy approaches. Clearly the policy initiatives at both national 
and regional levels since the late 1990s, heavily influenced by new claims as to the 
significance of knowledge of particular sorts in shaping success in the 
contemporary economy,  represent an ambitious attempt to remedy the situation 
and shift the region‟s economy onto a qualitatively different developmental 
trajectory, seeking both to position the region more advantageously in relation to 
the (allegedly) emergent „new‟ economy while echoing its nineteenth century 
„golden age‟ but on the basis of a much more consciously managed process of 
knowledge production and translation. The aim is to facilitate the production of new 
commodities, with unique selling points and dominant market positions, and/or to 
enhance the knowledge intensity and move up the value chain in producing 
existing commodities via capitalising (on) knowledge produced in the region‟s 
universities and translated through new intermediary organisations, the 
Centres/Pillars of Excellence.  
 
The success or otherwise of these initiatives raises important questions. First, are 
they working – or will they work in future – in their own terms, to meet their defined 
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goals? The answer to these questions remains as yet uncertain. Not least, this is 
because knowledge, no matter how original and novel, remains only one 
determinant of successful commodity production, corporate profitability and 
successful regional regeneration and too much weight may be being loaded onto 
knowledge per se as an agent of economic transformation. While there have been 
some promising signs, it is by no means certain that this developmental strategy 
will succeed. It is, for example, difficult to see that it will meet the target of 90,000 
jobs to be created in the new KBE and questions remain as to whether the region‟s 
universities will be able to perform the key role of nodes of research, knowledge 
production and dissemination assigned to them. There will undoubtedly be 
knowledge transfer from the universities but it remains to be seen whether this will 
be on the scale required to transform the regional economy – not least because of 
lack of demand and the limited capacity of the region‟s economy to absorb such 
new knowledge and associated innovations. Moreover, there are unresolved 
tensions between the production of scientific knowledge as a research goal per se 
– which may then open opportunities for commercial exploitation, or then again 
may not - and the consumption of such knowledge production to the pressing 
imperatives of capital. In short, it remains an open question as to whether the 
current round of policies in the north east will have their intended effects in 
facilitating the emergence of a KBE, especially as they are based in a limited and 
partial – even naïve – view of the knowledge transfer process (see also OECD, 
2006). For as Miles and Daniels (2007, 21) note, “Increasingly it is not individual 
companies that compete but trans-border supply chains of integrated companies 
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positioned in global markets. In the face of such massive unbundling‟, whither a 
national innovation strategy (let alone a regional strategy)?” This clearly calls into 
question the efficacy of territorially- bounded innovation strategies.  
Secondly, the region is seeking to pursue these policies in an increasingly 
competitive global environment, as cities, regions and national states all compete 
for investment. Many places that have gone through the same sequence of growth 
and decline as north east England are now seeking to develop knowledge-based 
economies, centered on the same restricted set of high technology activities and 
sectors. The pursuit of science-based – even science led - investment in sectors 
such as biotechnologies and nanotechnologies is rife. However, these are also 
broad and diverse sectors of activity. One implication of this is that “the way 
forward is to nurture „niche positions‟” (Miles and Daniels, 2007, 4). Consequently 
there is a need to identify precise niches and spheres of activity in which 
companies in north east England could, in principle at least, develop first mover 
advantage and significant competitive advantage and then to develop equally 
precisely targeted strategies to support their further successful development. 
There are one or two of initiatives that suggest developments along these lines. 
The first is the North East Stem Cell Institute (NESCI) is a unique interdisciplinary 
collaboration between Durham and Newcastle Universities, the Newcastle 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, the International Centre for Life in Newcastle and 
ONE NorthEast. It seeks to underpin cutting-edge research in stem cell biology 
and translate the results of this research into cost effective and ethically robust 
health solutions to ameliorate degenerative diseases, the effects of ageing and 
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serious injury. This in turn will provide a potential basis for commercialisng the 
results of research and provide the basis for the emergence of innovative new 
products and services in which firms in the region will have first-mover advantage7. 
A second example is the Plastics Electronics Technology Centre (PETeC) at the 
North East Technology Park (NETPark) in County Durham.  Following its merger 
with CENAMPS in 2007 and working in collaboration with multinationals and 
leading research bases, and both drawing on and facilitating cutting-edge research 
in the region‟s Universities, the Centre for Process Innovation (CPI) is establishing 
PETeC as an internationally recognised facility for the development and 
commercialisation of printed electronic devices and flexible functional 
materials. Plastic electronics will form the basis for a completely new range of 
applications across a broad set of markets including electronic consumer goods, 
automotive, aerospace, energy, retailing, food packaging, imaging, healthcare 
and fashion. Potential applications include smart packaging, real-time 
newspapers, intelligent signage, point-of-care medical diagnostic devices, novel 
drug delivery devices, smart sportswear, fashion clothes and accessories, printed 
electronics for consumer products, flexible solar cells and solid state lighting. 
Providing world-class facilities, services and expertise at the hub of a UK-wide 
network in plastic electronics, PETeC is becoming the national prototyping 
operation for these emergent new materials. It will establish the region as a 
global leader in the application of plastic electronics and will enable the 
development of internationally competitive, knowledge intensive activities, with 
                                                 
7
 For further information, see http://www.ncl.ac.uk/corporate-web-development/about/item/nesci 
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the potential for both new and established firms in the north east to derive first-
mover advantage in these innovative new materials and products manufactured 
from them.  
However, this degree of sophisticated targeting has not, as yet, developed more 
generally; nor have its wider implications been thought through in a systematic 
way. For example, it could have important implications for the types of university 
research that would be supported – and for those that would not be, with potential 
longer-term dangers of narrowing the gene pool in terms of the diversity of 
research in universities. Moreover, even if there was to be this degree of 
sophisticated targeting, it is important to remember that these policy-led attempts 
to both use the results of existing university research in regional innovation 
strategies and indeed shape such research in future so that it is directly linked to 
the needs of capital are constrained within the parameters and limits defined by 
capitalist relations of production. Consequently, there are precise limits to such 
processes, circumscribed by the limits to capital itself (HARVEY, 1982; JESSOP, 
2000) and by the limits to political strategies that seek to influence the form of 
capitalist development, which remains inherently and unavoidably uneven. 
Seeking to commodify existing knowledge and/or to produce future knowledge in 
commodity form cannot escape the contradictions inherent to processes of 
capitalist development and commodity production. Two are of particular relevance 
here: first, such development typically has unintended as well as – or instead of – 
intended results; secondly, such development is dynamically uneven and typically 
erodes the bases of its success over the longer-term. This is something that 
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proponents of approaches that prioritise knowledge, information flows and learning 
per se are prone to ignore. 
 
Thirdly, however, if the strategy does succeed in facilitating the emergence of a 
new KBE that, for a while, is both quantitatively and qualitatively significant in its 
transformative effects on the regional economy, there are two qualifications to be 
borne in mind. The first is that the historical-geography of the north east economy 
suggests that even when there was substantial indigenous R&D activity in the 
region, this was no guarantee of continued long-term economic success in/of the 
region. Profits made in the region were invested elsewhere, in other places and 
sectors (for example, railways in south America and banks in London). As the 
miners‟ checkweighman George Harvey put it in 1917, “capital knows no county”; 
no doubt if he were to come back now, he would emphasise that capital knows no 
country, indeed no continent. The second qualification is that even a successful 
KBE as envisaged within current policy discourse regionally and nationally would 
fail to engage large numbers of people in the region, for two reasons: first, it would 
generate insufficient jobs relative to the number of people seeking work; second, 
there would be great selectivity on the part of employers as to who would get those 
jobs. This strongly suggests the need for a more plural and heterogeneous 
conception of the economy, of development and of relevant knowledges in the 
context of a regional development strategy in the north east (and like regions). 
These are essentially theoretical tasks but the key issue is not so much re-
theorisations per se (vital though that is) but rather which theoretical conceptions 
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become dominant – even hegemonic – in policy discourse and practice and in 
politics. Most fundamentally, there needs to be acceptance of a broader 
conception of the KBE to encompass a wider range of activities and valorise a 
greater range of knowledges. There is a pressing need to recognise that all forms 
of economic activity are knowledge-based and to embrace a more heterodox and 
plural concept of the economy, to acknowledge that there is – of necessity – still a 
place for the branch plant economy alongside an emergent more sophisticated 
„knowledge based‟ economy. More than that, however, it is vital to acknowledge 
the presence of a social economy and an informal economy that will be crucial to 
any sustainable development strategy for the north east since the scale of 
employment creation in the formal economy, whether in its branch plant or 
„knowledge-based‟ variants, will simply be insufficient to absorb all those seeking 
work in the region. There is some evidence of growing recognition of such points in 
ONE‟s evolving approach to its regional development strategy although it remains 
uncertain as to how much weight will in practice be attached to such concerns. 
 
Finally, although the empirical focus in this paper has been upon the experiences 
of one region, north east England, this raises broader questions as to how different 
regions relate to and are positioned in the inherently uneven process of capitalist 
development and the changing knowledge bases and requirements of its leading 
edges.  For however much the emphasis switches to the significance of flows of 
knowledge in cyberspace as underpinning economic success and a resulting 
migration of capital into cyberspace, like all capital “it still depends on 
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territorialisation” (JESSOP, 2000, 4) – that is, on materialisation in specific cities 
and regions, which compete to be the sites of such materialisation and 
territorialisation. Thus many other regions with economic histories similar to that of 
north east England are pursuing similar policies to create new knowledge based 
economies – all believing that this will enable them to shift onto the high road of 
economic success, emulate the processes of self-reinforcing endogenous growth 
present in the key nodes of the global economy, and break with their peripheral 
status. Put another way, the assumption is that all regions will be able to engage in 
„win-win‟ scenarios. Some may indeed succeed in making this transition. However, 
as the history of north east England shows only too clearly, this is a far from easy 
task. Moreover, it is difficult to see how all can be winners in a capitalist economy 
that continues necessarily to be characterised by combined and uneven 
development. There are therefore clear limits to the new knowledge based 
economy – as there were with previous generations of regional policies - in 
addressing issues of uneven development.  
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